Rex Patrick: as US-China tensions rise Australia remains pitifully unprepared for war

Tensions are rising. Defence has received a list of desirable new toys, including nuclear submarines, to beef up capability. But as Rex Patrick asks, what’s the use of such a list in the hands of a department with a proven track record of taking decades to deliver anything?

This week at Senate Estimates the Defence Secretary, in response to questions from Senator Jacqui Lambie, laid out the “stark” geo-strategic situation confronting Australia to the north and went on to say: “We can no longer accept the fundamental underpinning assumption of Australian Defence Planning … that we would have at least 10 years warning time for any significant conflict that might involve Australia … We are assuming that significant conflict might break out in the Indo-Pacific in less time than that.”

The US shooting down a Chinese spy balloon is a risk for Australia’s tired submarine fleet

The new government’s response to the circumstances we find ourselves in has been to continue the work of the Morrison government’s AUKUS Nuclear Submarine Task Force and to commission an ‘Independent’ Defence Strategic Review’ by the former Chief of Defence Force (CDF), Sir Angus Houston, and former Labor Defence Minister, Professor Stephen Smith. 

But neither report will do any good if the Government doesn’t address the elephant in the room; we have a Defence department unable to deliver any serious capability in less than a decade. 

Sub-standard Defence performance

In the 2009 Defence White Paper and Defence Capability Plan the Defence Department (‘Defence’) laid out a plan for Australia to acquire a future submarine capability that would enter service in 2025, in time for the first Collins Class submarine to be withdrawn from service in 2026.

It took seven years for Defence to even make a decision on what to do. Sadly, with no regard to previous lessons about buying into risky bespoke projects, Defence recommended a pathway that involved a new French submarine design. The price tag was $90 billion and the scheduled delivery time (assuming there were no problems) was 2030.

Four billion dollars later the program was cancelled. The AUKUS Nuclear Submarine Task Force’s recommendations have not yet been announced, but we know the Task Force will endorse an unaffordable $170 billion nuclear submarine program that won’t deliver any new capability to our submariners until 2040.

That’s 31 years from announcement to a capability!

Dumb Ways to Buy: Defence “shambles” unveiled – former submariner and senator Rex Patrick

 

Oh, frig it

I don’t want to be seen to be overly harsh, but it’s deserved.

Another project, the Future Frigate program, was also announced in 2009: 

The Government intends to … replace the current Anzac class frigate with a more capable Future Frigate optimised for Anti-Submarine Warfare.

To reduce risk, Defence released a tender calling for a Military-Off-The-Shelf (proven) design with minimum change.

In December 2018, almost 10 years after it was announced, the Government signed a contract with BAE Systems Maritime Australia to build the ships. For perspective, it took what Defence believes is the entire warning time for a serious conflict to go from an announcement to signing a contract. 

The design ended up not being military-off-the-shelf, and the program has unsurprisingly been plagued with design issues, a key one being that the ship is heavier than planned.

The initial operational date for the new frigates was to be 2027 to 2028. It’s now set for 2031. That’s 22 years from announcement to at sea capability!

The government engaged Angus Houston and Stephen Smith to conduct the ‘Independent’ Defence Strategic Review’. Noting the elephant in the room, it’s worthwhile having a look at some of the Defence projects that were approved whilst they were CDF or Defence Minister.

Sir Angus’ track record?

Sir Angus served as CDF from July 2005 to July 2011. During this time, he presided over the presentation to Cabinet of an assortment of projects, including the following:

• The $16 billion Joint Strike Fighter Project. There has been great controversy over the capability of this particular aircraft (which can’t shoot down weather balloons at 60,000 ft), but the focus of this article is schedule delivery. The new air combat capability was given first pass approval in 2006 with a planned delivery of 14 initial aircraft in late 2016, but that delivery did not occur until 2019. This project saw 13 years from announcement to fielded capability.
• Phases 4 and 6 of the Muti-Role Helicopter program. From the 2006 approval to now, 17 years have passed, with the Defence Force having given up on this capability, ordering 12 new off-the-shelf Sikorsky MH-60 Romeo helicopters in May 2022 and then 40 new Blackhawk helicopters last month to replace them. So, what front line capability do we have to show for 17 years and 4 billion dollars, very little in fact a helicopter being pulled from service early .
• The $7 billion Air Warfare Destroyer program. This program was approved in 2007 for operational use in 2017, but ultimately took 13 years to field.

To be fair, there were a number of off-the-shelf systems procured within a short time frame while Sir Angus was CDF.

Professor Smith’s track record?

Stephen Smith served as Defence Minister from September 2010 to September 2013. During this time, he took a number of systems to Cabinet for purchase approval, including:

• The $1.4 billion C-27 Spartan Light Tactical transport. The project was approved in November 2011, with the 10 aircraft arriving in Australia between 2014 and 2016, and since being basically determined as not suitable to carry out its combat role. It has been used for emergency storm and flood relief work, but the Air Force is turning to an expanded Hercules Transport fleet to take over its true military capability. 
• The billion-dollar Army Battle Command System. This system got first pass approval in 2013 with an intended in-service date of 2022. By mid 2021 all it had achieved was project cancellation.
• The Air Forces billion-dollar Civil Military Air Traffic Management System. This system was conceived in 2011 and was to be in full service later this year. More than a decade later it’s on the projects-of-concern list with no-one really knowing when it will be delivered.

Again, to be fair, a number of off-the-shelf systems were procured within a short time frame while Stephen Smith was the Defence Minister.

Addressing the elephant in the room

I’m not sure calling in former Defence leaders, who have demonstrated poor judgment in Defence procurement in the past, to conduct an independent review to “help prepare Australia to effectively respond to the changing regional and global strategic environment and ensure Defence’s capability and structure is fit for purpose and delivers the greatest return on investment,” was the right choice.

Perhaps they had demonstrated to Defence Minister Richard Marles that they’d learnt from the past.

That aside, the fact is that the elephant in the room – addressing the inability of Defence to deliver the required capability in a shortened time frame noting the current circumstances, where that’s what’s needed – were not part of the review’s terms of reference.

We need a broom put through the bloated “we always need special, not proven, equipment” Defence procurement organisation, but that doesn’t appear to be on the table. In the face of a real and present national security threat, were likely to get a wish list of ‘shiny new toys’ that will be procured at the same glacial speed as has occurred in the past.

And the issue is serious. It’s not just about wasting money, as Defence has so often done in the past. It’s now very much about making sure we can deter conflict, and deal with it if deterrence fails. When it all goes bad you take what you’ve got to the fight, and a handful of contracts with blown schedules and budgets are not much of a weapon. 

I watched Senator Lambie hold back a ‘parliamentary explosion’ when she discussed warning times and the failures of the procurement at Senate Estimates. I wish she hadn’t because someone needs to put the proverbial ‘bomb’ underneath the Government and the Department.